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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/629,910	07/30/2003	Roy Lillqvist	060091.00217	6100
	7590 10/17/200 DERS & DEMPSEY L	EXAMINER		
8000 TOWERS	CRESCENT DRIVE	ADAMS, CHARLES D		
14TH FLOOR VIENNA, VA 22182-6212			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2164	
		MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
			10/17/2008	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/629,910	LILLQVIST ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
CHARLES D. ADAMS	2164	

	OTIVITALES B. ABANNO	2104
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence address
THE REPLY FILED 23 September 2008 FAILS TO PLACE TH	IS APPLICATION IN CONDITION F	FOR ALLOWANCE.
1.  The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or or application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of App for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 (periods:	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	it, or other evidence, which places the with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailin	g date of the final rejection.	
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or	later than SIX MONTHS from the mailin	g date of the final rejection.
MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07	(f).	
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of exunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b) NOTICE OF APPEAL	stension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply origi r than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The appropriate extension fee inally set in the final Office action; or (2) as
2. ☐ The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp	oliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be	filed within two months of the date of
filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exte Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed w AMENDMENTS	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a
<ol> <li>The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection,</li> <li>(a) They raise new issues that would require further co</li> </ol>	nsideration and/or search (see NO	
<ul> <li>(b) ☐ They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below)</li> <li>(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or</li> </ul>	•	ducing or simplifying the issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	-	ected claims.
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.1		mpliant Amendment (PTOL-324).
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s)		,
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>	llowable if submitted in a separate,	
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: 1-11,15 and 21-27.		ll be entered and an explanation of
Claim(s) rejected. <u>1-11,15 and 21-21.</u> Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:		
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE		
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good an was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>		
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessar	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails to provide a
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	on of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attached.
<ol> <li>The request for reconsideration has been considered by <u>See Continuation Sheet.</u></li> </ol>		n condition for allowance because:
<ul> <li>12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i>(s).</li> <li>13. ☒ Other: <u>See Continuation Sheet</u>.</li> </ul>	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)	
	/Sathyanarayan Panna	ıla/
	Primary Examiner, Art U	

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

In regards to the objections of claim 12 and the rejections of claim 13, because the claims have been cancelled, the objections and rejections regarding them will be withdrawn

In regards to claim 1, Applicant argues that "Tsukui fails to disclose receiving any data to be supplied to database operations. In fact, Tsukui fails to disclose any database or operations pertaining to databases. It should be noted that e.g. the edition RAM 104 of Tsukui simply provides a work area for editing an e-mail address. Thus, edition RAM 104 of Tsukui corresponds to a regular, conventional random access memory of a computer apparatus, which - as such- does not constitute any kind of database". In response to this argument, it is noted that 'database operations', as claimed, can be any command involving a database. In this case, the edition RAM stores data. This data is stored in both text data RAM and backup RAM. All of these memories are databases. Tsukui discloses storing data in the RAM. Storing data in a database is a 'database operation'. It is also noted that the labels are stored in a database, such as Figure 5. Also see 5:52-59.

Applicant explains that "Tsukui fals to teach converting an Internet domain name into a second format such that at least two successive labels of the Internet domain name are combined to form a single label ... However, there is no disclosure, whatsoever, of a conversaion in which two or more successive labels of an Internet domain name of the first format would be combined to form a single label of an Internet domain name of second format. Instead, e.g., in Figure 3 of Tsukui discusses how to divide an e-mail address into predetermined segments. In the process of Tsukui, the address is examined segment by segment by comparing the extracted segments into stored in the backup RAM to find out if the extracted character string is stored in the backup RAM."

Applicant then elaborates by stating "No two labels are combined to form a single label. For example, separate labels 'co' and 'jp' separated by a dot (i.e 'co.jp') stay as separate labels (i.e. as 'co.jp'; see column 4 and Figure 4 of Tsukui) in the process of Figure 3. They are not combined to form a single label". In response to this argument, it is noted that the two distinct labels "co" and "jp" are "combined" and stored in the same spot in another part of the memory. They are stored as a single label (see 4:5-25), while being separated from the other labels. Two separate labels are treated as one label in memory. Thus, they are combined.

Applicant also argues "there is no conversion of an Internet domain name of a first format into a second format in Figure 3 of Tsukui. Instead, only e-mail address segments are extracted for comparison purposes but they, or the complete e-mail address, are not converted into any second format. Even if some segments were stored separately, they would still not constitute the original address in a second format, but only incomplete parts of the original address still in the first format." In response to this argument, it is noted that the separate labels of the Internet domain name are stored in a database, after some of the labels have been combined. As they are seperated and classified, the Internet domain name is stored in a different format than before, when all the labels were entered as a single unit.

Applicant argues that "as explained above, there is no disclosure in Tsukui of converting an Internet domain name. Thus, Tsukui also fails to disclose such conditional converting" and "Tsukui fails to suggest supplying any data to any database operations. In addition, as mentioned above, there is no second format of Internet domain name disclosed in Tsukui". In response to these arguments, it is noted that the elements referred to are taught in Tsukui, as explained above and in the Office Action of 23 July 2008.

Applicant also argues that "finally, the e-mail address stored in the backup RAM 106 is not in any second format but is still in the original format. The fact that the address may be stored divisionally (or in a divided manner) does not change the address format per se. For example, the e-mail address tsukui@rdmg.mgcs.mei.co.jp would retain its format even if it is stored divisionally because no part of the original address is changed during the storing process according to Tsukui". It is noted that no definition of 'format' appears in the claims that would prevent storing items divisionally from qualifying as a second format. It is noted that the address is entered in one format - as one entire string. It is also noted that the address is then separated, and stored in a separated format. Thus, the Internet Domain Name is converted into a second format.

Applicant argues that Bagley does not remedy the above-identified dificiencies of Tsukui, the combination of Tsukui and Bagley fails to disclose or suggest all of the elements of claims 3-5 and 22-24. In response to this argument, it is noted that Tsukui teaches the elements as described above and in the Office Action of 23 July 2008.

Applicant argues that "Khello does not remedy the above-identified deficiencies of the combination of Tsukui and Bagley and consequently the combination of Tsukui, Bagley, and Khello fails to disclose or suggest all of the lements of any of the presently pending claims". In response to this argument, it is noted that Tsukui teaches the elements as described above and in the Office Action of 23 July 2008.

Applicant further argues that "Khello fails to disclose or suggest 'conditionally converting at least one of said at least one Internet domain name into a second format of Internet domain name in which at least two successive labels of the at least one of said at least one Internet domain name are combined to form a single label' ... In Khello there is no conversion into any format of Internet domain name, but in Khello an E.164 is merely extracted from the original Internet domain name. That is to say, in Khello the original Internet domain name as such is not actually converted into another format, and certainly is not converted into another format of Internet domain name, even if it could be said (not admitted) that Khello's 'internet domain name' is converted into a format of some other kind or that Khello's E.164 number is converted into a format of 'internet domain name.'" It is noted that Khello is not relied upon in the Office Action of 23 July 2008 to teach this subject matter. Rather, Tsukui is relied upon to teach it.

Continuation of 13. Other: As there are no substantive amendments to the subject matter of the claims, the claims will remain as rejected in the Office Action of 23 July 2008.